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Coopération et évaluation : le cas d’ebay
 The web site eBay founded on September 3, 1995 by 
computer programmer Pierre Omidyar constitutes a good 
illustration of the success of electronic marketplaces. 
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Current thinking
 eBay 2006 :
- 60 million users either bid or listed an item on 
eBay
– > 200 million transactions (computers, 
furnitures, vehicles, collectibles…)
– $34.2 billion woth of goods
– Frauds at less than 1 percent of all listing
 Why do people trade on informal online markets
 The success of online markets constitutes a 
challenge for economists.
Indeed several features of online marketplaces make the occurrence of 
opportunistic behaviors much easier than in traditional markets
 Anonymous traders
 Changing one’s identity
 Isolated trades and 
 Geographical distance
 Occasional relationship
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Current thinking
 Examples of opportunistic behavior :
 Buyer’s risk : delivery, quality. 
 The seller can be dishonest on 
 the quality (exaggerating the quality),
 delivery (not shipping, shipping slowly, Shipping items other than those
described )
 Giving a deliberately misleading description
 Returning items other than received
 Seller’s risk : payment.
 The buyer can be dishonest on the payment
 Receiving merchandise and claiming otherwise
 Credit card fraud, in the form of both stolen credit cards
2007
Current thinking
No Trust, no trade!!!
Some mechanisms are generally 
implemented in order to reduce 
opportunism on online market 
• Centralized systems (B2B)
– Centralized monitoring
– Exclusion of opportunist traders
• Decentralized systems (E-Bay)
– Peer monitoring
– Peer sanctioning
Current thinking
2007  
Current thinking
2007  
 Is Ebay Feedback Forum determinant for 
its succes?
• "The majority of people are honest and mean well. […]. But you can 
unfortunately, on occasion, run into unscrupulous folks, […] Our approach 
is to eliminate them systematically in order to protect the honest ones, and 
your active participation is vital to this effort. Sign up with eBay and make 
use of our evaluation procedure to leave comments on other members. 
Feel free to compliment those members who are deserving and cite
grievances when merited."
 Pierre Omidyar, eBay founder
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Current thinking : Ebay’s Feedback
A brief survey ...
 Empirical studies : the influence of rating and 
evaluation on prices and transactions
Ghose, Ipeirotis and Sundararajan (2006) AmazonMarketplace
Houser and Wooders (2005);0.17/0.24 eBay
 Empirical studies on the determinants of 
evaluations
Dellarocas, Fan and Wood (2004) (altruism, reciprocity, selfish)
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)
 Experimental studies on reputation, trust and 
evaluation
Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2004) 
Chen, Hogg and Wozny (2004) : market game
Keser (2003) : trust game in e-Bay context
 2007
Research questions 
 2007 
-Experimental investigation of ebay using a 
trust game  
The aims of our study are threefold :
First, we investigate the effects of evaluation on 
cooperation between traders
Second, we analyze the different motives for 
evaluating her/his partner
Research questions 
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⇒The different motives for evaluating her/his partner : 
I may be willing to assign negative (positive) points to sanction 
(reward) an unfair (fair) behavior (payment, quality, 
delivery,…) [Direct reciprocity]
I may be willing to assign negative (positive) points for having
received negative (positive )evaluation [Indirect reciprocity]
I may be willing to assign positive points because I expect that
such points will lead my partner to reciprocate by sending me a 
positive evaluation [Strategic reason]
Research questions 
 2007
Third, Does the introduction of mechanisms that 
reduce both strategic and non strategic evaluation 
incentives allow improving the informational 
content of evaluations and hence stimulating 
cooperation among partners?
Experimental design
 Groups of 10 players (5 players A and 5 players B) playing 20 periods of a 
two stage game under a stranger matching protocol
Stage 1 : Simultaneous Trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe, 1995)
• Decisions
• Player A sends a part or all of her/his endowment to player B
• Player B returns a part between zero and the received amount to player A
• Payoff functions 
• Player A’s payoff : 10-sent amount +received amount
• Player B’s payoff : 10+3*received amount-returned amount
Stage 2 : Evaluation stage
 Each player can evaluate   her/his partner (+1/-1 point of evaluation)
 Evaluation is directly costly for the sanctioner : a cost of 1 point for 
evaluating     his/ her partner
 Evaluation is indirectly costly for the sanctioned player : this cost is 
constituted by her/his feedback rating that will provide some information to future 
other partners at the beginning of each future period
 2007
Experimental design
 4 experimental treatments
• BASELINE : Trust game (no stage 2) 
• CURRENT : Trust game + stage 2 :
Sequential Endogenous Evaluation
2 phases of evaluation : each participant is given the 
choice to either evaluate immediately (in phase 1) or to 
wait (phase 2).
 2007
Experimental design
• VARIANT 1 : Trust game + stage 2 :
Sequential exogenous Evaluation
• The processing of VARIANT 1 is identical to the 
CURRENT system described above, except that the 
order in which players evaluate one another has been 
predetermined (randomly) by computer at each period. 
 2007
Experimental design
• VARIANT 2 : Trust game + stage 2 : 
Simultaneous Evaluation
• The processing of VARIANT 2 is identical to the 
VARIANT 1 system described above, except that the 
decisions of evaluation are taken simultaneously
 2007
Experimental design
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 Parameters of the 
experience
• Computerized experience using 
Z-tree Sofware
• CREM/LABEX, France, Rennes
• 246 players 
• Average Payment : 15 euro+3 
euro
• Sessions : 7 BASELINE sessions (5 sessions with groups 
of 10 players and 2 sessions with groups of 8 players)
• 6 sessions for each of the three other treatments with 
groups of 10 players)
 2007
A comparative analysis of eBay 
evaluation systems
 2007
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Figure 2: Distribution of investment level
Fig 1. Player A’s average invest.
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Results : investments
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Figure 3. Player B’s return for each player A’s investment level
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Results : investments
 2007
Fig 2. Player B’s average invest.
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Results : investment decisions by treatment
 2007
Baseline CURRENT VARIANT 1 VARIANT 2
Player A 's
investment
2.24
(2.91)
3.32
(3.22)
4.17
(3.50)
4.36
(3.70)
Player B's
investment
1.45
   (3.16)
3.00
  ( 4.81)
3.98
(5.35)
4.21
(6.32)
Invest.
Return
11,86% 19,15% 22,45% 22,82%
• In all treatments, evaluations increase the average 
level of investment (return)
• The level of investment (return) is significantly 
higher when :
• The order in which players evaluate one another is 
predetermined (VARIANT 1)
• Evaluations are simultaneous(VARIANT 2)
Results : Determinants of the amounts invested      
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All treatments Treatments with evaluation
Variable
Amount chosen by
Player A during
period t (1)
Amount chosen by
Player B during
period t (2)
Amount received during t-1 1.925*** 1.505*** -0.195***
(0.254) (0.287) (0.046)
0.610*** 0.564***Cumulative positive evaluations
(partner's profile) (0.068) (0.090)
-0.273*** -0.342***Cumulative negative evaluations
(partner's profile) (0.048) (0.120)
-0.027 0.485Positive evaluation in t-1
(partner's profile) (0.297) (0.379)
-0.147 0.059Negative evaluation in t-1
(partner's profile) (0.199) (0.429)
CURRENT 0.548***
(0.174)
VARIANT 2 1.091*** 0.462*** 1.362***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.300)
VARIANT 1 0.979*** 0.370** 0.669**
(0.178) (0.180) (0.310)
Period -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.159***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.033)
Period_20 0.002 -0.111 -0.834
(0.293) (0.344) (0.588)
Constant 1.737*** 2.565*** 3.540***
(0.189) (0.233) (0.386)
Results : investments
 2007 
• In all treatments, evaluation significantly increases 
the average amount invested (return).
• A modification to the CURRENT evaluation system 
in favor of more heavily constrained rules (i.e. 
evaluations submitted in a predefined order -
VARIANT 1, or simultaneous evaluations -
VARIANT 2) leads to greater trust and investment.
Results : investments
 2007
 The amounts sent in a current period (period  t) depend 
on the amount received during the previous period 
(period t-1). 
 The amounts sent in a current period (period  t) depend 
on one’s partner’s profile : 
− Cumulated positive evaluations have a positive and 
significant effect on investment 
− Cumulated negative evaluations have a negative and 
significant effect on investment 
− Both positive and negative evaluations from the previous 
period have no effect
 2007
Determinants of evaluation
 2007
Figure 5. Average evaluation over time
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
0,5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
current variant1 variant2
Results : Evaluation
Who?
 Both player A and player B assign points to their partners.
 Player A assigns more negative points whereas player B attributes
in majority positive points
When?
 Players evaluate more under the CURRENT and VARIANT 1 
treatments than under the VARIANT 2 treatment.
 Players assign more positive points when they evaluate first but 
send more negative evaluationswhen they evaluate in second 
position
Why?
 Positive (negative) evaluations are given for high (low) levels of 
investments /returns
 2007
Results : Evaluation determinants
(Probit model with random effects on the probability of negative evaluation 
using a selection bias correction)
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Variable (1)  
A's evaluation 
of B 
(2) 
B's evaluation  
of A 
Amount received -0.241*** -0.430*** 
 (0.043) (0.067) 
Evaluated during Phase 1 -1.574*** -0.785** 
 (0.471) (0.328) 
0.004 -0.358 received a positive evaluation 
AND knows this result (0.428) (0.649) 
1.785** 0.812** received a negative evaluation 
AND knows this result (0.827) (0.403) 
Constant 3.810*** 2.607** 
 (0.789) (1.070) 
 
Results : Evaluation determinants
 2007
 The probability of negatively (positively) evaluating one's partner 
decreases (increases) with the amount received. (Direct reciprocity) 
 Proceeding with an immediate evaluation (phase 1) tends to reduce 
the probability of a negative evaluation (Strategic motives)
 The positive and highly significant coefficient of the cross variable 
"Received a negative evaluation AND knows this result" indicates
that players use negative evaluations as a means of reprisal (Indirect 
reciprocity) 
Conclusions and extensions
Main conclusions
– Simple Internet-Based Reputation Systems have positive 
effects on cooperation
– However more complex systems may lead individuals to 
cooperate more and may prevent individuals from adopting 
both strategic and non strategic behaviors that negatively 
affect cooperation. 
Suggestions to improve the eBay feedback mechanism
 Blind evaluation
 Limited timing to evaluate one’s partner
Conclusions and extensions
– Extensions of our study
– Investigation of more complex online markets with 
endogenous formation
– Investigation of the evaluation system as a public good game
